Euro vs. the Dollar: Can Europe Achieve Financial Sovereignty?

2026/10/26, 00:34
A single currency is no longer enough: Europe’s political and economic sovereignty now requires not only a single central bank and a stable common currency, but also a globally significant single capital market and the euro’s emergence as a key global currency.

“The introduction of the euro is an absolute necessity, and this step is in Germany’s fundamental interests,” German Chancellor Helmut Kohl told the German public in 1998, seeking to dispel widespread skepticism about the euro’s planned launch in electronic trading.

Before that, former U.S. Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan had predicted that the euro would indeed enter circulation, but that its life would be short.

Nobel Prize-winning economist Paul Krugman called the euro a triumph, a symbol of a kind of victory over paper theory. But in practice, things turned out quite differently. More than a quarter of a century has now passed, and at best the euro has achieved only half of what was intended.

The euro began circulating as the currency of eleven countries. Today, it is legal tender in 21 EU member states. In the other EU countries, it is effectively the second official currency. As a result, the single European currency has become the second most important currency in the global monetary system.

However, the euro still lags far behind the dollar. In particular, while the euro accounts for one-fifth of global foreign-exchange reserves, the dollar still accounts for more than half. The American currency dominates international bond trading, international trade in goods, trade in resources on global commodity markets, the international payments system, and financial markets—in short, everywhere. The United States is not only the world’s largest economy; it also has the world’s largest and most liquid capital market. Through its Treasury bonds, the United States issues what is arguably the world’s safest capital-generating asset, one that investors greatly value during crises.

Treasury bonds form the foundation of the global financial system. They are included in the reserves of central banks in most countries and serve as collateral for commercial banks, pension funds, insurance companies, and other investors. In short, the dollar is unquestionably the key global currency. It allows Americans to obtain goods from every country in the world in exchange for paper money they themselves print.

It is only thanks to the enormous ongoing demand for the dollar that the U.S. government can continue to finance its debt, which exceeded $40 trillion in August 2026. China has recognized the advantages of having a global currency, and the yuan is often used for settlements under the Belt and Road Initiative, which links the economies of many developing countries. A substantial share of China’s foreign trade with internationally isolated countries such as Russia and Iran is conducted in yuan, China’s national currency. As a result, the dollar’s global dominance is weakened, at least to a small extent.

Nevertheless, the Chinese government restricts the convertibility of its national currency. From this perspective, there are more reliable convertible currencies whose exchange rates are determined by supply and demand on the international foreign-exchange market. The yuan’s global significance is likely to remain limited in the near future.

The euro area, for its part, has a single monetary policy but no single capital market. It has a single central bank, but no European institution operating on the basis of common European government bonds—eurobonds. Instead, there are 21 financial markets, each with its own eurobonds.

Germany alone can no longer fill this gap. The volume of German federal bonds relative to Europe’s GDP is too small, and even if the German federal government increased its debt through various off-budget funds, that would probably still not be enough. This kind of fragmentation in the euro area leaves Europe’s financial system vulnerable to the powerful U.S. markets. Even if we measured its importance to the global economy solely by gross domestic product, on which basis Europe ranks second in the world, its market capitalization would still be too small compared with that of the United States.

Europe long ignored questions of its own sovereignty because the United States acted as the guarantor of a stable liberal world order. At the same time, the dollar was not only the leading global currency but also a symbol of economic stability. Europe grew accustomed to relying on the international payments system to function at all times and under all circumstances, and on financial markets to remain liquid even during a severe crisis, because the Federal Reserve would inevitably come to their aid by injecting dollar liquidity.

That guarantee is now gone, with Donald Trump in the White House, the global system destabilized, and the geopolitical order increasingly characterized by fragmentation.

China is actively building its own sphere of influence in Asia. The United States is turning toward autarky. Trump has begun using trade relations and trade-policy tools to fight the country’s trading partners. He imposes sanctions on both friendly and unfriendly countries. In general, he has turned foreign policy into an instrument of power politics—of wielding a fist. In the short term, the dollar’s global dominance allows the U.S. president to use it as a weapon that no other country possesses.

Ultimately, Trump will probably become something of a gravedigger of the global American order—or the U.S.-centered order—that emerged after the Second World War. Europe, of course, owes the United States its security, prosperity, and a prolonged period of stability lasting several decades. But now the Old World is being forced to grow up at a rapid pace, despite its centuries of experience, and prove its own strength.

Those who continue to rely on the financial infrastructure of a great power that has become an unreliable partner in fulfilling its commitments find themselves in a politically disadvantaged position.

Strategic autonomy now begins in the capital market. The means currently available to overcome this dependence are quite limited. Europe has lower debt than the United States, and its external trade balance—the euro area’s balance of payments—has traditionally been balanced or in surplus. Inflation in the EU is also often lower than in the United States, and the European Central Bank enjoys a strong reputation worldwide. Despite this, Europe has yet to complete its Monetary Union institutionally by creating a union of capital markets.

EU countries’ capital markets are not interconnected. The financial integration project is moving forward slowly, and the financial sector remains highly fragmented. The largest financial institutions today operate in Asia and America, but not in Europe. National regulations and bankruptcy laws, tax regimes, and financial supervisors differ greatly, and there are no common standards.

International investors encounter a patchwork of different rules in Europe, while the U.S. market appears to be a single financial and economic space. As a result, European savings do not finance innovation. The United States is running a massive budget deficit. The United States and its tech giants generate their revenues there, while the capital that helps generate those revenues comes from Europe.

Being a key currency is not simply a political decision. A global currency is not elected or appointed like a president or a parliament; it makes its own way because market participants trust it. And, as is well known, trust arises where contracts are enforced, or where there are shared interests, a large market, scale, liquidity, legal guarantees, and political stability. Where all these elements come together, trust takes hold. Achieving these goals requires deepening Europe’s capital market through liquid bonds—whether by creating eurobonds or issuing other instruments comparable to U.S. Treasury bonds that could serve as a benchmark asset.

For a long time, common European bonds were treated as something of a political taboo in Germany in particular. For example, the Alternative for Germany party itself emerged in 2013 amid strong Euroskepticism in the country. Unlike during the crisis at the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century, eurobonds today are no longer seen as a crisis-management tool. They could instead express the unity and strength of a united Europe, as well as its readiness to match the scale and weight of America and China. But EU countries now find themselves at a historic crossroads: are they prepared to cede some of their national sovereignty in favor of a stronger Europe, or do they want to remain for a long time to come a group of small and medium-sized countries that will be little more than diminutive observers of the geopolitical struggles and rivalries between the leading global powers?

Author: Doctor of Economics; Associate Professor and Professor in the Department of World Economy and International Finance, Faculty of International Economic Relations, Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation, Mikhail Vyacheslavovich Zharikov.

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